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**VALUING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND STAKEHOLDERS IN THE
INTERAGENCY PLANNING PROCESS**

by

Christopher T. Barber, Major, USAF

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Advisor: Lieutenant Colonel James S. Kockler

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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Preface

Most military members know very little about how civilian agencies conduct planning, particularly with respect to interagency planning. Similarly, most government civilians know very little about the military planning process. I hope this paper will help to fill those gaps in understanding to a small degree. Additionally, the primary purpose of this paper is to examine the military and civilian planning processes, as well as a contemporary business planning process, to discover process refinements that will make interagency planning more effective.

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Abstract

The United States (US) government requires effective interagency planning to operate successfully in the current, global environment. However, the US government's performance while conducting interagency planning has been poor in the last 40 years. Interagency planning for operations in Somalia and Bosnia is representative of this record of poor performance. The US government has taken positive steps to improve interagency planning, especially in linking Department of Defense and Department of State planning efforts. However, interagency planning must improve further to address effectively the increasingly complex environment in which the US government operates.

This paper seeks to identify ways to improve the process of interagency planning. To accomplish, the paper analyzes the strategic planning models of the DOD and the office of the coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, as well as a contemporary business model. The paper identifies commonalities and best practices and concludes with recommendations for improving the interagency planning process. The papers recommendations are to incorporate a method to help interagency planners understand the culture of organizations participating in joint planning and to incorporate the interests and inputs of stakeholders, who are not formally part of an organization. These approaches, drawn from the business model, will improve understanding and facilitate collaboration among planners throughout the interagency planning process.

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[I]nteragency planning should not seek to replace functional planning activities within departments and agencies. Rather, the interagency planning process should be used to mobilize and integrate the specific capabilities of those departments and agencies to enhance their collective ability to achieve the objectives of national security strategy.¹

- Said and Holt, “A Time for Action: The Case for Interagency Deliberate Planning”

Haiti and Interagency Planning

In 1991, the Haitian military overthrew the elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

After two years of diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions, including numerous oil embargoes, the United States (US) issued an ultimatum to the Haitian military junta in December 1993 to restore Aristide. The junta rejected the ultimatum. In response to the junta’s defiance, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution in May 1994 demanding the junta resign. On 31 July, the UNSC authorized “all necessary means” to restore Aristide.² Subsequently, US forces landed in Port-au-Prince on 19 September 1994 to force the junta out of power. Clashes between US forces and pro-junta forces ended on 30 September. When President Aristide returned on 15 October 1994, US forces began drawing down. Finally, the UN assumed control of the situation in January 1995.³

Though the operation ultimately achieved its stated objective, US Government (USG) planning for operations in Haiti was poorly integrated. Problems with integration at all levels stemmed from the fact planning efforts were ad hoc and did not follow established processes. Though strategic coordination for an integrated USG approach to Haiti occurred at the National Security Council (NSC), interagency coordination below the NSC-level was extremely limited. More specifically, departmental planners rarely met with other agencies to coordinate their efforts. When planners met, they met in clusters instead of meeting as a complete, interagency group. Additionally, planners never completed their coordination from the strategic to the

tactical level. Surprisingly, USG agencies conducted no coordination of tactical plans until US forces were physically in Haiti!⁴ Finally, the fact the NSC defined the USG end state based upon US Atlantic Command's *military* plan illustrates interagency planning did not follow established processes.⁵ Thus, interagency efforts were not aligned or synchronized because planning occurred in 'stovepipes' at all levels below the NSC.

In addition to poor integration, USG interagency planning was incomplete because these stovepipes led planners to focus only on their respective organizations instead of collaborating with other stakeholders. For example, US Atlantic Command did not divulge the elements of the military plan to other agencies because of security concerns.⁶ This left critical gaps in the overarching interagency plan. Similarly, problems in execution developed as a direct result of "military and civilian organizations' mutual ignorance of counterpart culture and capabilities."⁷ Additionally, planners from the military, civilian agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) were completely unaware of each other's plans. Together, these breakdowns led to assumptions that translated to gaps in the comprehensive civil-military plan.⁸

In examining the USG's planning process, the 1994 Haiti intervention provides a representative example of interagency planning. Led by an NSC-established Executive Committee, the 1994 intervention is representative because the planning and execution involved DOD and non-DOD departments, such as the State Department, conducting an interagency stability operation.⁹ Clearly, the 1994 Haiti operation suffered from lack of integration among agencies, failure to plan fully, and failure to follow established processes. Thus, identifying effective governmental approaches to address these issues while conducting interagency planning can prevent similar shortfalls in the future.

Background and Necessity for Improved Interagency Planning

Today's increasingly globalized environment demands integrated interagency planning to address issues affecting United States (US) national interests, such as RS operations.

Additionally, growing concerns over government spending and expanding US commitments abroad demand integrated interagency plans for more efficient use of limited resources.

Historically, the various departments of the USG have conducted planning for situations or operations abroad relatively independent of one another, with the majority of the coordination occurring when planners from DOD and DOS attempt to mitigate conflicts between their individually produced plans days or weeks prior to, or in the midst of, execution. As noted previously, the USG's involvement in Haiti lacked coordinating interagency planning. Similarly, operations in Somalia and Bosnia represent two more examples of inadequate integration in planning with multiple USG stakeholders.¹⁰

Spurred by the mediocre success of the preparation and execution in Somalia and Bosnia, the USG has taken positive steps to link DOD and DOS planning efforts. Both the Clinton administration and the George W. Bush administration have implemented policies to better integrate interagency planning, though these policies have not achieved the preferred results.^{11,12} As a result, the current interagency planning process represents only limited improvement over the process used to plan for Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. Meanwhile, the number of conflicts involving USG interests continues to increase, demanding truly efficient and integrated interagency planning and execution. Thus, the USG must take active steps to cease ad hoc, department-centered planning to produce a truly integrated and effective interagency planning process. Fortunately, analyzing existing planning models offers solutions for increasing interagency effectiveness and efficiency.

Methodology

This paper will review and compare three models to identify methods to improve the interagency planning process. Following a description of basic strategic planning models, the paper will summarize and explain the Department of Defense's (DOD) "Joint Operations Planning Process", the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization's (S/CRS) "Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation," and a contemporary business model called "Applied Strategic Planning." Next, the paper will compare and contrast these models to highlight specific aspects from each that can improve the interagency planning process involving DOD and the S/CRS office. Since the "Joint Operations Planning Process" is the oldest documented model of the three, this paper will use it as the baseline for comparison among the models. Finally, the paper will give specific recommendations of aspects from the various models that can make the interagency planning process more effective and efficient.

Strategic Planning Models

Strategic planning is a macro level process for designing an organizational approach to achieve long-term goals. The term 'strategy' represents different things to different people. *The American Heritage Dictionary* defines strategy as "the science or art of military command as applied to the overall planning and conduct of large-scale combat operations."¹³ While the term originally applied specifically to military operations, many groups and organizations have adapted the premise of strategy to non-military activities. The basic characteristics of strategy that apply to most endeavors are: designing a macro level approach to achieve a preferred goal, deliberate planning for actions towards that goal, and coordinating the efforts of multiple individuals or organizations. As noted in the definition, one fundamental aspect of strategy is

planning, or strategic planning. Thus, effective strategic planning should produce a comprehensive, macro level approach that facilitates coordinating the efforts of multiple individuals or organizations toward a preferred goal. Though the intent of strategic planning is basically the same for all organizations, the methods for conducting strategic planning vary greatly.

Strategic planning models share a few elemental characteristics. Generally, the elements common among all strategic planning models are: analyzing the problem and the environment; defining the preferred goal, or end state; determining potential methods to achieve the goal; selecting a specific method; and developing a comprehensive plan that incorporates and coordinates the actions of members or organizations. First, the *analysis* step is a critical and detailed step in any planning process involving both analysis and evaluation of numerous factors such as the organization's capabilities and resources, the competitor's capabilities and resources, the preferred goals, requirements, restraints, the operating environment, and risks. Careful and comprehensive analysis in this step enhances overall understanding of the situation and usually yields a better final plan. Second, *defining the preferred goals, or end states*, is important to delineate clearly the organization's preferred outcomes in a manner that guides the planning process and informs decisions in execution. Third, *determining potential methods to achieve the goal* explores and outlines several methods, or broad schemes, to achieve the defined goals. The focus in this step is to develop reasonable, macro level methods to meet goals and their supporting objectives. Fourth, *selecting a specific method* involves evaluating the available methods and retaining the best approach, or combination of approaches, to achieve the goals and supporting objectives. This may involve excluding all but one method or combining several methods to yield the final plan. Finally, *developing a comprehensive plan* that incorporates and

coordinates the actions of members or organizations outlines a detailed scheme to link the macro level method to day-to-day, or tactical, operations. The resulting comprehensive plan, or strategic plan, enables effective planning and guides execution at lower levels. Additionally, this plan should maximize resources and develop synergy by coordinating the efforts of sub-organizations to achieve the organization's goals effectively and efficiently.

Though most strategic planning models share several common steps, many of the specific processes employed in various models to accomplish those steps are unique and differ significantly. These differences are not necessarily right or wrong. Instead, differences in the structures, purposes, or operating environments of organizations influence the specific processes of various planning models. Thus, understanding the structure, purpose, and operating environment of an organization helps one understand the mechanics of the strategic planning model the organization employs. Additionally, comparing models highlights aspects of different models one can apply to a model to make it more effective and efficient. In this respect, several existing planning models offer potential solutions for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the interagency planning process.

Joint Operation Planning Process

The Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) model is a comprehensive, highly detailed planning model with extensive doctrinal support. The model addresses initiation of planning through refining the plan during implementation. The model, described in depth in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 *Joint Operation Planning*, provides detailed steps to ensure planners conduct thorough planning. A detailed narrative describes each step and links the steps to other portions of the model. In addition to the narrative contained within JP 5-0, a substantial amount of documented doctrine supports the model, including DOD- and service-

specific doctrine, such as JP 1-0 *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* and Air Force Doctrine Document 2 *Operations and Organization*. One of the primary reasons behind such detailed documentation of the DOD planning process is the need to facilitate and coordinate planning in a massive organization employing over 1.4 million personnel.¹⁴ Figure 1 depicts the JOPP graphically.




Figure 1. Joint Operation Planning Process¹⁵

The first step of the JOPP is “Initiation.” The President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) initiates planning and issues appropriate guidance concerning the United States government (USG) goals and related requirements concerning a conflict, or potential conflict. The military options the president seeks in response to a conflict represent only one of the USG’s available instruments of power (IOP). As such, leaders expect DOD planners to develop those military options in combination with other departments or agencies.¹⁶

In step two, “Mission Analysis,” the commander responsible for conducting an operation, the Combatant Commander (CCDR), defines the military end state, or goal, for the operation

based on the president's national strategic end state. Additionally, the CCDR and his staff analyze a wide range of factors including the source of the conflict, friendly and enemy capabilities and resources, risks, and many facets of the operating environment. In this step, the CCDR and staff explicitly document assumptions and develop a mission statement.¹⁷ Finally, the CCDR and staff develop a list of operational activities, known as Lines of Operations, necessary to achieve the military end state.¹⁸

The focus of the third step is “Course of Action (COA) Development.” The CCDR and staff develop several potential approaches, or COAs, to achieve the national strategic end state and the military end state, as well as associated objectives. These COAs must be reasonable and should outline strategic and subordinate tasks, the organizational structure, required capabilities. While moderately comprehensive, the COAs associated with the strategic plan do not define tasks at the tactical, or day-to-day, operations level. Additionally, the CCDR and staff develop branch plans in this step.¹⁹

“Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming,” the fourth step, consists of the CCDR and staff analyzing each potential COA and evaluating its probable effectiveness against the enemy by wargaming, or simulating, its employment. During the wargaming, the CCDR and staff identify certain specific criteria defined by the commander as “critical to mission accomplishment.”²⁰ In this step, the CCDR identifies potential points requiring contingency plans, known as branches.

Step five is “Course of Action Comparison,” wherein the CCDR and staff evaluate the level of effectiveness of each COA in satisfying the specific criteria defined by the commander. After evaluating all COAs in relation to the commander’s criteria, the CCDR and staff compare the overall evaluation, or merit, of each COA to identify the “COA with the highest probability

of success.”²¹ Effectiveness is the predominant factor in evaluating the relative merit of a COA, while efficiency is desirable but not required. While the mission of the DOD is success in conflict, that success rarely, if ever, is defined by fiscal efficiency. Instead, success is defined by effective deterrence or coercion, often achieved through the application of force and violence in a relatively inefficient, yet effective, manner.

The sixth step is “Course of Action Approval.” The CCDR considers the overall evaluation of each proposed COA and “selects a COA, or forms an alternate COA based upon the staff recommendations and the commander’s personal estimate, experience, and judgment.”²²

“Concept of Operations Development” is the seventh and final step in which the CCDR and staff expand the approved COA into a detailed plan describing how to integrate the efforts of each sub-organization. Developing the expanded plan, or Concept of Operation (CONOPS), involves coordination and collaboration with planners from each participating organization, including organization outside of DOD. The developed Concept of Operation is the basic plan the CCDR disseminates to all organizations participating in the operation.

Planning Framework

As a division of the State Department, the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) employs the Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation model, commonly referred to as the Planning Framework. The relatively new Planning Framework is a comprehensive, moderately descriptive model with minimal doctrinal support. In contrast to the DOD, the DOS is a much smaller organization employing only 49,900 personnel, including foreign nationals.²³ As a result, DOS has not historically needed extensive documentation for the planning process because planning coordination is much simpler in such a relatively small department. However, an increase in the

DOS's planning responsibilities necessitated more extensive documentation of planning processes.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 established the S/CRS office in December 2005. Additionally, NSPD 44 assigned the Secretary of State, assisted by S/CRS, the responsibility of coordinating all government activities related to Reconstruction and Stabilization (RS).²⁴ As a result, the S/CRS office developed the Planning Framework to address the increased complexity of the new interagency planning requirement. It is a comprehensive model addressing planning from initiation of planning through refining the plan during implementation for multiple USG Departments. Though not as detailed as the DOD model, the Planning Framework is moderately descriptive with narrative describing each step and linking the steps to other elements of the model.

The Planning Framework differs from the DOD model in three significant ways. First, it includes a process for recommending USG-level policy goals, a step not included in the DOD model. Second, the Planning Framework has limited amplifying doctrinal support, in contrast to the DOD model that has extensive amplifying doctrinal support. Finally, the model is generally untested because it was developed and approved within the past five years. The lack of related doctrine and the untested nature of the model stem from the fact that the S/CRS organization, with its responsibility for coordinating RS for all USG entities, is relatively new. While no one document describing RS planning existed prior to the formation of S/CRS, the agencies that participated in RS activities followed informal processes to plan for and to conduct RS operations. After NSPD 44 assigned responsibility to the S/CRS office, it undertook the task of formalizing and documenting the existing processes, with some modifications and adjustments.

The first step of the Planning Framework is "Receipt of the Problem." The President or a

designated authority, such as the National Security Council (NSC) director or the Secretary of State (SecState), identifies a problem, intent, US interests, and available assets. The NSC then forms a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) or a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) to address the problem. Additionally, a portion of the PCC identifies entities, or organizations, that are likely to participate in RS efforts but are not under the authority of the PCC.²⁵

Step two is “Situational Analysis,” or “Problem Analysis.” In this step the strategic planning team, composed of planners from either the PCC or the CRSG, conducts a detailed analysis to understand the problem by examining of multiple factors such as causes of conflict, USG interests, available resources, possible contingencies, intelligence requirements, and many facets of the operating environment. As part of their analysis, the planning team develops causal hypotheses, which are “assumptions about how elements of the environment will react to stimuli.”²⁶ Finally, in collaboration with representatives from participating organizations, the strategic planning team produces a Situational Analysis Overview Memo for senior leaders and policy makers, such as the President or members of the NSC.²⁷

“Theory of Resolution and Goal/Endstates,” the third step, involves four sub-steps. First, in this step, planners develop transformational hypotheses that postulate “how external stimuli could realistically be applied . . . to generate a specific effect . . . to address the key elements identified in the situational analysis.”²⁸ Part of the formulation of hypotheses involves documenting critical planning assumptions, particularly ones that might require an alternate ‘branch’ plan. However, the Planning Framework model does not address branch plan development extensively. Second, the strategic planning team develops one or more proposed USG goals and endstates. In this model, a goal is the final condition of the problem area or

region the USG seeks to achieve and an endstate “describes what achieving the goal looks like.”²⁹ Third, the planning team develops several, usually three, theories of resolution that describe COAs that could reasonably achieve the goals and endstates.³⁰ Each COA also includes operational activities, called Major Mission Elements, critical to achieving the overarching goal.³¹ Taken together, each associated hypothesis, goals and endstates, and theory of resolution represent one ‘policy option’. Finally, the NSC Deputies’ or Principals’ Committee selects and approves one of the policy options to serve as the official USG policy toward the country requiring R/S support, allowing the strategic planning team to commence with in-depth planning on the selected policy option.³² The approved policy option represents the mission statement in this model.

In step four of the Planning Framework, “Plan to Achieve Goal/Endstates,” the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), the Integration Planning Cell (IPC), as well as planners from the DOD Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and the in-country embassy begin developing a detailed concept of operations (CONOPS) for achieving the goals and endstates based on the approved USG policy.³³ This CONOPS not only includes metrics for measuring the effectiveness of the COA, but also identifies necessary capabilities, including those that are not resident within the USG. Once the majority of the CONOPS is fleshed out, the Principals’ or Deputies’ Committee reviews the plan and provides feedback. This step is analogous to the “COA Approval” step of the JOPP. After receiving feedback, the strategic planning staff makes any necessary adjustments and publishes a detailed plan in the form of a Strategic Plan.³⁴

“Act to Affect Resolution” is the fifth step, wherein the S/CRS office or CRSG issues guidance to subordinate authorities and both manages and supervises implementation of the

plan.³⁵ This step is part of execution.

The sixth and final step is “Assess, Adjust, Advance.” The S/CRS office, the CRSG, and other participants monitor the environment and the problem during execution and adjust the COA as necessary to ensure progress towards achieving the desire goals and endstates.³⁶ This step is part of execution.

Applied Strategic Planning

The Applied Strategic Planning model, representing contemporary business models, is the product of multiple years of business experience and refinement. The model, like many other business models, is necessarily non-specific, somewhat ‘shallow,’ and supported by numerous business theories. The Applied Strategic Planning model is necessarily non-specific because it is designed to apply broadly to almost every form of business, including not-for-profit and governmental operations.³⁷ In addition, the model is ‘shallow,’ lacking numerous specific sub-steps, because it could not provide extensive details while retaining its applicability to disparate endeavors. However, the model is moderately descriptive because a lengthy narrative describes the principles and functions of each step in the process and provides some historical examples. Several of these steps apply to interagency planning. Finally, numerous business theories support the Applied Strategic Planning model, which its authors developed from common planning models used in the business world for decades. Though the authors based the model on 18 years of experience, they refined the model through six years of implementation in various business endeavors.³⁸

The first step of the Applied Strategic Planning (ASP) model is “Planning to Plan.” In this step, the organization’s leadership develops commitment to the planning process among the senior leaders, especially the chief executive officer (CEO), and the executive directors. The

leadership, also, identifies the members of the planning team. Additionally, the planning team performs a critical initial action by identifying stakeholders who need to be apprised of the planning process as well as methods for keeping both participants and non-participants in the planning informed. In this model, stakeholders are groups that are not formally members of the organization but perceive they will be impacted by significant organizational actions. Finally, leadership informs the members of the entire organization of the initiation of planning and educates the members on the process.³⁹ Figure 2 depicts typical business related stakeholder relationships.



Figure 2. A Model of a Typical Organization’s Stakeholder Relationships⁴⁰

“Values Scan” is step two. Of the three models examined here, this step is unique to ASP. In this step, the planning team assesses the values, operating philosophy, and culture of the entire organization.⁴¹ Initially, the planning team assesses the personal values of the members of the planning team, usually through a questionnaire. Next, the team assesses the values of the organization as a whole. Additionally, the planning team assesses the organization’s operating

philosophy and culture. Finally, the team assesses the values and interests of the stakeholders.

The most important aspect of the stakeholders assessment is analyzing the consequences of meeting or not meeting the stakeholder's interests.⁴² However, an organization's culture is the most important characteristic to analyze and understand when conducting the Values Scan because it is reflective of the values of the members and the organization, the organization's assumptions about the world, and the organization's operating philosophy.⁴³ Figure 3 defines Values Scan terms.

value – “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.”⁴⁴

operating philosophy – philosophy “which explains how the organization approaches its work, how its internal affairs are managed, and how it relates to its external environment, including its customers or clients.”⁴⁵

culture – “a pattern of basic assumptions . . . that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel.”⁴⁶

Figure 3. Values Scan Terms

One can best analyze an organization's culture by examining an organization's heroes, rites and rituals, and cultural network. First, organizational heroes “personify the organization's values . . . and serve as clear role models.”⁴⁷ Understanding who the organization's heroes are and why they are heroes helps to “clarify and personalize organizational values” for a one who is not a member of the organization. Similarly, one gains great insight into an organization by examining its rites and rituals because they are “the ceremonies and other programmed routines that help define an organization's expectations (and underlying values) for employees.”⁴⁸ Understanding these rites and rituals will help non-members operate more effectively when interacting with the organization because they allow non-members to operate within the norms of the organizational system. Finally, one understands how the organizational culture is maintained

by identifying the cultural network, which is the group of individuals who protect and perpetuate the organization's values and cultural information. Identifying these individuals allows one to operate interact effectively with an organization because these individuals facilitate acceptance of the strategic plan and incorporation of the plan into day-to-day operations.⁴⁹

In the third step of ASP, "Mission Formulation," the planning team outlines the organization's reason for existence, its purposes or functions, and the methods it will use to fulfill its purpose. After determining these aspects of the mission, the planning team articulates a mission statement that clearly describes "the scope and direction of the organization's activities and . . . should provide a template for decision making by people at all levels in that organization."⁵⁰ This mission statement mirrors the mission statement employed in the JOPP.

Step four, "Strategic Business Modeling," consists of the planning team determining what kind of specific futures they hope to achieve, creating a list of developed operational activities to achieve that future, and documenting the preferred future. First, the team conceives several potential future states and selects from that pool of futures which ones they hope to achieve. These futures are analogous to the objectives of the JOPP. Second, the planning team devises a list of fully developed operational activities, known as Lines of Business (LOB), necessary to achieve the selected futures. Third, the team determines the organizational culture necessary to facilitate achieving those futures.⁵¹ Finally, the team "produces a concrete and quantified version of the organization's preferred future."⁵²

The planning team assesses the organization's current status in "Performance Audit," the fifth step. First, the team identifies internal strengths and weaknesses as well as external opportunities and threats, also known as SWOT analysis. Second, it identifies the organization's available resources. Third, the team assesses how the current organizational culture influences

the organization. Fourth, it assesses several aspects of the organization’s environment.⁵³

In step six, “Gap Analysis,” the planning team compares the results of the Performance Audit to the requirements for achieving the preferred futures to determine gaps and the probability of success. First, the planning team identifies gaps between resources and requirements to determine if the company has the ability to bridge the gap, through growth or retrenchment. Second, based on the gap analysis, the team assesses the probability of achieving the preferred futures.⁵⁴ If the futures are unattainable, the planning team must readdress the Strategic Business Modeling until a viable plan emerges.⁵⁵

“Integrating Action Plans,” the seventh step, is interesting and unique because the ASP model combines numerous sub-steps from distinct JOPP and Planning Framework steps into a single ASP step. In this step, functional managers develop an operational plan for each selected LOB. Then, the planning team evaluates the operational plans and incorporates the plans, with adjustments as necessary, into the organization’s strategic plan. First, managers of each of the organization’s functional divisions, such as Human Resources or Marketing, develop a detailed, six-element operational plan for their sub-organization for each LOB selected in the Strategic Business Modeling step. Second, planners assess each operational plan by evaluating it against both the environment and the organization’s strategic objectives. Some operational plans may be revised as a result of the evaluations. Third, the planning team, supervised by the CEO, allocates resources among functions based on the operational plans. Finally, the CEO weaves the operational plans “together into a seamless whole,” known as the strategic plan.⁵⁶ The resulting strategic plan is analogous to the JOPP’s approved COA or the Planning Framework’s approved CONOPS.⁵⁷

The eighth step is “Contingency Planning,” wherein the planning team prepares “to take

specific action(s) when an event not planned for in the formal planning process actually does take place.”⁵⁸ Planners develop contingency plans by identifying the most important threats and opportunities that are not likely, identifying trigger points to initiate action, and agreeing on the appropriate actions to take.⁵⁹ ASP contingency plans are analogous to the JOPP’s branch plans. The planning team creates the contingency plans after developing the approved strategic plan. Additionally, it does not formally assess those plans.

The ninth sequential step, “Implementation,” consists of the organization adjusting its structure and implementing the strategic plan. First, the planning team assists the CEO in designing an organizational structure to facilitate implementing the strategic plan. Second, after arranging the structure appropriately, the organization turns the strategic plan into action. Finally, the organization monitors progress during implementation to determine if adjustments to the plan are necessary.⁶⁰ This step is analogous to the Planning Framework’s last two steps, “Act to Affect Resolution” and “Assess, Adjust, Advance.”

Two elements of the ASP model are steps that are continuous throughout the model: “Environmental Monitoring” and “Application Considerations.” The planning team employs these ‘steps’ in every step of the planning process as well as implementation. The “Environmental Monitoring” step consists of continuous observation of the internal and external environments to assess the effects of those environments upon the organization and the planning process. The “Application Considerations” step is a means of attempting to build and maintain involvement by the organization’s members in the planning and implementation process. The ASP model lists three guidelines for involvement. First, organizational leaders should seek broad scale involvement immediately. Second, leaders should seek “involvement to the greatest extent possible.”⁶¹ Third, leaders should encourage “as much participation as feasible in

decision making about the plan.”⁶² While every member of the organization will not be part of the planning team, every member must be involved in the overall process in some manner. The ultimate purpose of organization-wide involvement is to draw out the maximum number of useful ideas and to develop ownership, or commitment, among the organization’s members.⁶³

Models Comparison

Building upon a foundation of similarities, interagency planners must capitalize on the best practices unique to each model to create an effective, well-integrated interagency planning process. Relying solely on current commonalities, the interagency planning process will continue to be moderately effective, at best. First, all three models incorporate the five basic elements of strategic planning. Though each of the models arrives at the finalized plan in a slightly different manner, all produce a detailed, goal-oriented final plan to coordinate the organization’s efforts. Second, differences in terminology aside, all of the models share remarkably similar elements, such as lines of business/operation and measures of effectiveness. Third, the two models that directly support the interagency planning process, the JOPP and the Planning Framework, accommodate both contingency planning and crisis action planning. These similarities represent commonalities upon which interagency planners can build more effective processes.

In contrast, significant differences in the models possess the potential to hinder interagency planning. However, understanding the differences and incorporating the best aspects of the various models into the interagency planning process will make this process more effective. First, each of the models follows a unique path to arrive at the final strategic plan. Second, the Planning Framework and ASP represent truly strategic planning models, while the JOPP is a sub-organization planning model. Third, the Planning Framework and ASP

incorporate stakeholder interests, whereas the JOPP does not. Finally, ASP is unique because it incorporates a Values Scan, not present in the other two models, that has the potential to enhance the interagency planning process.




Figure 4. Graphical Depiction of Models

The first significant difference is each model employs a unique method for arriving at the final, official strategic plan. The major elements that differentiate each model are determining end states, developing operational activities, proposing and approving approaches, and fully developing the final plan. Figure 4 depicts each model graphically to illustrate the differences in these elements. Similarly, Appendix A characterizes each model by the major actions accomplished in each step. Since these elements are interrelated within each plan, adjusting one

of the elements will necessarily affect the other elements. Despite the variations among models, the differences stem from the role of the planning process in the organization.

In the JOPP, civilian leaders dictate the national strategic end state from which military leaders derive the military end state. Since the national strategic end state provides necessary guidance and parameters for the DOD, military leaders are able to develop their own military end state.⁶⁴ From the military end state, planners develop a set of operational activities, or LOOs, that will be common to any approach they develop. Figure 5 depicts an example of stability LOOs.⁶⁵ Once they establish the LOOs, planners create multiple approaches, or COAs, to achieve the military end state. Finally, after rigorously evaluating each of the COAs independently, the CCDR selects and approves a COA to represent the final plan. Once the final COA is selected, planners fully develop it to create the CONOPS.




Figure 5. Example of Stability Lines of Operation⁶⁶

In contrast, the Planning Framework begins at the strategic level and establishes the national strategic end state that actually initiates the JOPP. In the Planning Framework, planners account for national-level considerations to develop several potential USG policy options. In this respect, planners develop a range of policy options for the USG representing the spectrum from non-confrontational to hard-line, or from minimal investment to significant undertaking. Planners develop a full list of sectoral goals, or MMEs, for *each* proposed policy option. While this may appear redundant, it is necessary because the end state ultimately drives the operational activities to achieve it. Thus, in the Planning Framework, distinctly different proposed end states often will necessitate distinctly different MMEs. Unlike the JOPP, a single leader does not select or approve the policy option, including both the national strategic end state and its associated MMEs. Instead, a group of civilian leaders from the NSC selects the official policy option. Guided by the official USG policy, the CRSG, IPC, as well as GCC and embassy planners develop an in-depth plan that will represent the final strategic plan, upon review by the NSC.

The ASP model diverges from both the JOPP and the Planning Framework because ASP planners develop the organization's end state, or future states, without any approval by the organization's leaders. Interestingly, the organization's leaders do not approve anything in the process. Instead, the CEO supervises resource allocation and integrating the multitude of operational plans into a single, final plan. Similar to the JOPP, ASP planners develop a single set of operational activities, or LOBs, from the end states. However, the next portion of plan development differs from the JOPP in that functional managers develop a sub plan for their specific functional area to address each LOB. In the JOPP, sub plan development does not occur until after the CCDR approves the final COA. In ASP, these sub plans represent the building blocks for the final plan. After the functional managers have produced the sub plans, planners

evaluate each sub plan to determine if it is oriented to achieving the preferred end state and if it is feasible in the operating environment. If the sub plan is acceptable in both respects, planners incorporate it into the overall plan. This evaluation and ‘approval’ is closest to the COA Approval in the JOPP. Finally, the CEO takes a lead role by integrating, or weaving together, all of the sub plans into a comprehensive strategic plan.

The second significant difference in the models is the Planning Framework and ASP represent planning of the highest order, while the JOPP represents sub-organization level planning. Both the Planning Framework and ASP determine the strategic direction of the organization as a whole. In contrast, the JOPP represents a planning model designed for a sub-organization of a larger entity because the macro level strategic direction of the superior organization, the USG, determines its sub-organization level direction. Therefore, civilian policy makers dictate the USG’s National Strategic End State to the DOD because it is a subordinate organization of the USG. Then, the DOD develops its Military End State, a subset of the USG strategic end states.⁶⁷ Thus, the JOPP does not account for developing the macro level strategic direction, yet developing macro level direction is inherent in both the Planning Framework and ASP. More importantly, the Planning Framework yields a USG policy that is the basis for the National Strategic End State. Hence, the JOPP is subordinate to and dependent upon the Planning Framework.

The third difference is both the Planning Framework and ASP explicitly address identifying stakeholders and incorporating their interests into the plan, whereas the JOPP is ambiguous concerning the role of stakeholders. The two models incorporate them into the planning process, while the Planning Framework explicitly includes stakeholders in the decision making process. This concept reflects the consensus-based nature of interagency decision

making and encourages timely, effective interagency decision making by reducing the need to ‘run it up the chain.’⁶⁸ Similarly, ASP includes stakeholder’s interests in the planning process, as a minimum, but encourages direct involvement of stakeholders in the planning process.

Incorporating stakeholders into ASP encourages support for the strategic plan while minimizing active resistance to the plan on the part of stakeholders.⁶⁹ In contrast, the JOPP includes no sub-steps or considerations relating to stakeholders beyond a reference to developing the military approach “in combination with other nonmilitary options.”⁷⁰ While DOD planning for combat operations will exclude many stakeholders for the sake of maintaining operational security, planning for non-combat operations, such as RS, can include stakeholders.

The Planning Framework and ASP demonstrate consideration for stakeholders because the purposes of the S/CRS and profit-driven businesses necessitate integrating stakeholders. The purpose of the S/CRS office, as a division of the DOS, is to lead and manage USG civilian efforts to stabilize and rebuild societies in order to encourage democracy and facilitate that nation’s integration into the international community.⁷¹ Building and maintaining relationships with disparate organizations and entities, both within and external to the USG, is essential to fulfilling this purpose effectively. Similar to a profit-driven business, the S/CRS office must work with and maintain relationships with entities it has no authority or control over, such as the Department of Revenue or the International Committee of the Red Cross, in order to carry out its mission. Failure to do so represents long-term risks to successful interactions in the future as a result of strained relations with a vital stakeholder. Thus, considering and incorporating the concerns of stakeholders is critical to successfully fulfilling the purposes of the S/CRS office. By extension, success for the S/CRS office allows the DOS to fulfill its mandate to coordinate and lead all USG efforts in RS.

The fourth difference is the ASP model includes a Values Scan. Unlike the JOPP and the Planning Framework, ASP includes a step that specifically examines the perspectives and cultures of everyone involved in the planning process, including stakeholders. Initially, understanding the personal values of the members of the planning team allows planners to understand the perspective of those they will be working with and to identify common values. This will facilitate interactions within the planning group. Next, understanding the values, operating philosophy, and culture of the organization as a whole allows the planning team to establish end states desirable to the organization and to make appropriate decisions in developing the plan. This step helps by guiding the planning effort and by establishing parameters for the planning group. The fact the planning team characterizes and documents the organizational operating philosophy and values helps to explain why the CEO does not approve the COAs or the strategic plan the organization pursues. Since the *organizational* operating philosophy and values guide the planning team's efforts and end states, the CEO does not need to act as the organizational filter because the best needs and acceptable approaches for the organization, determined in the Values Scan, dictate the planning team's actions. Finally, values and interests of the stakeholders help the planning team to develop a 'global' perspective as well as to understand the ramifications of meeting or not meeting the stakeholder's interests. Such broad perspective and understanding ostensibly should allow the planning team to assess more accurately the highly complex environment in which the organization operates and to make better decisions than if they had not considered the stakeholders.

Recommendations for Improving Interagency Planning

In order to make interagency planning more effective and efficient, the S/CRS office should incorporate the Values Scan into the Planning Framework. Currently, neither the JOPP

nor the Planning Framework includes a process for planners to assess and understand the other planners they work with or the organizations involved in the planning process. Yet, the insight and understanding the Values Scan develops is particularly relevant in the interagency planning effort expressly because the planning effort involves so many people from such diverse organizations that developing some level of understanding and ‘norming’ the group is necessary before commencing the planning effort. The internal environment represents a critical aspect of the larger environment. Understanding the internal environment, both within the planning team and within each organization in the interagency planning process, helps provide a complete picture of the situation. Without an understanding of the values, operating philosophies, and cultures of both planners and the organizations they represent, interagency planners are working with only a partial picture of the inherent capabilities and potential friction points among USG stakeholders.

Incorporating the Values Scan would improve interagency planning in three important ways. First, understanding the personal values and culture of the individual members of the planning team will help each member interact and communicate more effectively with the other members. It also will help members identify common values. Second, understanding each organization’s values, operating philosophy, and culture will help planners to identify similarities and differences among their respective organizations more quickly to address them more efficiently. Third, such understanding will help planners negotiate aspects of the plan more effectively because they will be able to communicate in terms more familiar and more meaningful to others. For the relatively small investment of time to conduct a Values Scan, the resultant returns in efficiency and effectiveness for the interagency planning process are significant.

Mapping Schwartz's (1992) Values Circumplex Model Onto the Work Values Survey

Schwartz's conceptual dimensions	Schwartz's universal values	Work values dimensions	Specific items used in present study
Self-transcendence	Universalism	Altruism	Making the world a better place Being of service to society Contributing to humanity
	Benevolence	Relationships with others	Forming relationships with coworkers Getting to know your fellow workers quite well Developing close ties with coworkers
Self-enhancement	Achievement/hedonism	Pay	Salary level Total compensation The amount of pay
	Power	Prestige	Gaining respect Obtaining status Being looked up to by others
Conservation	Security	Security	Being certain of keeping my job Being sure I will always have a job Being certain my job will last
	Conformity/tradition	Authority	Distinct reporting relationships A clear chain of command Definite lines of authority
Openness to change	Stimulation	Variety	Doing a variety of things Doing something different every day Doing many different things on the job
	Self-direction	Autonomy	Doing my work in my own way Determining the way my work is done Making my own decisions

Respondents were asked to rate each of the 24 items in the “Specific items used in present study” column on a 1 – 5 scale for each of the following questions:

1. “How much is the right amount for you?” 1 (*none*) to 5 (*a very great amount*)
2. “How much is present in your work?” 1 (*none*) to 5 (*a very great amount*)
3. “How important is this to you?” 1 (*not important at all*) to 5 (*extremely important*)
4. “How important is this at your organization?” 1 (*not important at all*) to 5 (*extremely important*)

Figure 6. Example for a Questionnaire⁷²

Functionally, interagency planners can conduct the Values Scan by completing a simple questionnaire, by delivering introductory briefings addressing specific Values Scan points, or by using a combination of these approaches. Planners could use two different types of questionnaires, separately or together. The first version is a relatively subjective version that would ask questions soliciting descriptions of the three aspects that best describe an organization's culture.⁷³ Planners could use each respondent's answers to ‘get a feel’ for the other planners and their organization. The second version of questionnaire could employ

subjective questions answered on a numeric scale. Planners could use statistical analysis to determine the trends among group members and their organizations. Figure 6 shows an example for a questionnaire used to assess values of workers and their organization. Organizational experts could produce a model more appropriate for interagency assessment. Further research is required to develop this concept further. A clear drawback of a questionnaire requiring statistical analysis is the time and expertise required to analyze the raw data. Additionally, interagency planners could deliver to the group a relatively short briefing about their organization addressing points such as organizational mission, organizational capabilities, organizational structure, potential contributions to the interagency operation, and areas of greatest concern or interest for their organization. Similar to the subjective questionnaire, planners could use these briefings to ‘get a feel’ for the other planners and their organization. Finally, interagency planners could use a combination or variations of these approaches, such as briefing the answers to the first questionnaire, to develop understanding within the planning group.

Another way to make interagency planning more effective and efficient is to improve stakeholder integration in the JOPP and the Planning Framework, though implementation will not be simple. Currently, little documentation exists of the formal process for identifying and evaluating stakeholders and their interests in either planning process. The DOD has taken steps to increase interaction with stakeholders, to include the addition of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) into the doctrinal combatant command structure and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) into the staff organizations below the combatant command level.⁷⁴ However, the processes for incorporating the interests and inputs put forth in these groups are ill defined. Further research is required in the most effective way to incorporate consideration for stakeholders formally into both the JOPP and the Planning Framework.

Certainly incorporating stakeholders into the planning process will be problematic in both the DOD and DOS environments, but will be particularly difficult in the DOD because of the significant requirements for operational security. Yet, despite the difficulties of implementing initiatives to improve stakeholder integration, integration will improve interagency effectiveness in several ways.

Integrating stakeholder interests and inputs into the interagency planning process will improve effectiveness and efficiency by developing a global perspective, enhancing the image of DOD and DOS, and by garnering support from other entities for USG efforts. Just as in ASP, considering the values and interests of the stakeholders helps to develop a ‘global’ perspective as well as to understand the ramifications of meeting or not meeting the stakeholder’s interests. This perspective will assist the planning team in assessing more effectively the highly complex environment in which the interagency team operates. Additionally, integrating stakeholder interests and inputs will enhance the reputation of the DOS and the DOD as ‘inclusive organizations’ among entities such as other USG agencies, foreign governments, international governmental organizations (IGO), and non-governmental organizations (NGO). Such a reputation will engender trust and encourage participation that will be beneficial for the USG in the long term. Finally, integrating stakeholders will garner support and will facilitate success for several reasons.

The first, and most important, reason garnering support will facilitate success is it prevent entities from hampering USG efforts and will encourage entities to actively support those efforts. Second, support for the USG can translate to entities actively assisting with the USG effort. That assistance may be in the form of manpower to distribute the workload or in the form of resources to reduce the net cost to the USG. Third, developing support for USG efforts will attract

individuals or entities that have specialized, extensive networks which they developed over many years. The ability to tap into these networks will provide the USG the ability to achieve greater effects in regions where the US has not maintained a presence to earn the trust and cooperation of the local population.

These recommendations propose unilateral changes to agencies involved in interagency planning since this approach would not be as difficult to implement as exercising Congressional action or Presidential direction. In the *Strategic Studies Quarterly* article, “A Time for Action: The Case for Interagency Deliberate Planning,” the authors review historical examples illustrating the difficulties of implementing governmental change through Congressional action or Presidential direction. The authors explain that Presidential direction to improve interagency planning may seem relatively simple, but it is only effective for very narrow improvements because institutional inertia ensures only the specific points addressed by a Presidential directive are implemented.⁷⁵ Conversely, the authors illustrate that legislation, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, is extremely effective, but Goldwater-Nichols took nearly 20 years to achieve its preferred improvements.⁷⁶ However, the authors note that when leaders of governmental agencies unilaterally institute changes in deliberate planning, those changes often result in widespread changes that occur relatively quickly.⁷⁷ Finally, the proposed recommendations do not require organizational or budgetary changes to implement, which often are the most significant impediments to improvements within the government. Thus, implementing these recommendations will have minimal, cost-related impact upon interagency institutions because they are almost entirely procedural.

Findings

While the primary effort of this work focused on improving the process of Joint

Operation Planning, research suggests the DOD could enhance the process of Force Planning by incorporating aspects of ASP. The JOPP and ASP represent models for effective planning of operations. However, aspects of the ASP specifically address allocating resources to an organization's numerous functional areas. Similarly, a significant piece of Force Planning involves dividing and allocating USG resources to the separate military service, which are functional areas within the DOD. In ASP, elements of the Values Scan, Strategic Business Modeling, and Gap Analysis directly influence how the planning team and CEO divide and allocate limited resources to competing functional areas. Thus, translating those aspects of ASP to DOD Force Planning can increase the effectiveness and efficiency in the process. Figure 7 depicts Force Planning as one of three subsets of DOD Joint Strategic Planning. Further research is required to determine the approach to implement these changes within the Force Planning process, however, the potential benefits warrant examining potential changes to the process. Yet, the greatest barrier to implementing substantive changes in how the DOD allocates resources is the budgetary structure and system, established by law, that only legislation can change. Thus, this level of change is highly unlikely.




Figure 7. Joint Strategic Planning⁷⁸

Incorporating aspects of ASP into the Force Planning process can improve its effectiveness and efficiency by helping DOD leaders create the necessary structure and culture within the services to achieve preferred end states. First, planners using ASP identify the organization's preferred, long-term end states in Strategic Business Modeling. These end states ultimately drive the specific plans of each functional area for how they will achieve those end states. Planners evaluate those operational plans based on the previously determined long-term end states. Following the evaluation and subsequent approval of those plans, the CEO and planning team allocate resources with the intent of developing the necessary structure to achieve those end states. Similarly, DOD leadership can apply this approach to develop the appropriate structure effectively and efficiently within the service components to achieve long-term end states. Second, ASP identifies an organization's culture in the Values Scan, determines the necessary culture to achieve preferred end states in Strategic Business Modeling, and identifies changes in the organizational culture necessary to create necessary culture in Gap Analysis. This cultural analysis directly influences how the organization allocates resources by prioritizing which functional areas need the most resources to create an organizational culture necessary to achieve preferred end states. This same process can help the DOD appropriately allocate resources to achieve preferred end states.

The US Air Force's "21st Century Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy" demonstrates the applicability of ASP to the DOD in both Joint Operation Planning and Force Planning. The strategy states,

First and foremost, we must mitigate our strategic risk by inculcating warrior ethos and adaptability into our culture, organizations, and processes. The success of the Air Force and the joint team depends upon the ability of our people and organizations to adopt new, relevant operational concepts, suitable to the dynamics of the strategic environment. . . . This risk specifically demands the

holistic, balanced approach presented in this paper to ensure the Air Force, as a member of the joint team, has a comprehensive strategy for deterring and defeating all of our Nation's potential adversaries.⁷⁹

In this section, the irregular warfare strategy describes the necessity to adapt culture, organizations, and processes. The ASP model specifically incorporates all three dimensions of an organization. While ASP primarily is a model for addressing culture and effective processes in developing a strategic plan for operations, aspects of the model apply to structuring the organization. In this respect, aspects of ASP can enhance operational planning in the JOPP as well as organizational structuring in Force Planning. Additionally, the strategy states irregular warfare “should be considered a permanent feature of the strategic landscape.”⁸⁰ Finally, it highlights the fact that success for the joint team depends on adopting “new” operational concepts. Given the documented success of the ASP model, now is the time to integrate this concept into DOD processes to ensure success in this strategic landscape.

Summary and Conclusions

In an increasingly complex and resource constrained security environment, effective and efficient interagency planning is an absolute necessity. In this environment, the DOD and the S/CRS office employ different approaches to strategic planning that interagency planners must attempt to integrate in order to plan effectively. The JOPP, the Planning Framework, and ASP represent three similar, yet distinctly different models for strategic planning. Comparing these models yields aspects interagency planners can apply to both the JOPP and the Planning Framework to make the interagency planning process more effective and efficient. Specifically, the DOD and the S/CRS office should incorporate the ASP model’s aspects of Values Scan and stakeholder integration into the interagency planning process to achieve success while operating in the current security environment.

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- ¹ Said et al., “A Time for Action,” 39.
- ² Hayes et al., *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions*, 15.
- ³ Ibid., 10-7.
- ⁴ Ibid., 33-6.
- ⁵ Dobbins et al., *After the War*, 55.
- ⁶ Hayes et al., *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions*, 32-6.
- ⁷ Ibid., 36.
- ⁸ Ibid., 38-40.
- ⁹ An NSC Executive Committee (EXCOM) is now referred to as a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC).
- ¹⁰ Dobbins et al., *After the War*, 43-6, 63-71.
- ¹¹ Said et al., “A Time for Action,” 33.
- ¹² Jennings, “We’re All Here,” 75-78.
- ¹³ *The American Heritage Dictionary*, 1203.
- ¹⁴ Department of Defense, “Military Personnel Strength.” The Permanent Change of Station cycle and institutional necessity to rotate personnel to give individuals breadth of experience causes a high turnover rate in most organizations. This high turnover rate keeps corporate knowledge at most levels very low, necessitating extensive documentation to supplement corporate knowledge.
- ¹⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning*, III-20.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., III-19. “The JSCP [Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan], CPG [Contingency Planning Guide], and related strategic guidance statements (when applicable) serve as the primary guidance to begin contingency planning.” III-19.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., III-21 – III-23. This paragraph summarizes pages III-21 – III-23. The mission statement “describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose – a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. [It] contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how [to accomplish the mission].” GL-17
- ¹⁸ Ibid., IV-19.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., III-28 – III-29. This paragraph summarizes pages III-28 – III-29.
- ²⁰ Ibid., III-31.
- ²¹ Ibid., III-32 – III-33. This paragraph summarizes pages III-32 – III-33.
- ²² Ibid., III-34.
- ²³ State Department, “General Information.” In the State Department, where the turnover rate is much lower, corporate knowledge is significant and many processes work efficiently because the participants have established informal norms and have a detailed understanding of requirements despite the absence of documentation.
- ²⁴ National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts,” 2.
- ²⁵ *United States Government Draft Planning Framework*, 2-3.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 6.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 4-8. This paragraph summarizes pages 4-8.
- ²⁸ Ibid., 12.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 14.
- ³⁰ The development of each COA includes defining objectives that must be achieved in order to reach the preferred goals and endstates.
- ³¹ Ibid., 15.
- ³² *United States Government Draft Planning Framework*, 11-7.
- ³³ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. “Whole of Government Planning,” 19.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 19-25. This paragraph summarizes pages 19-25.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 33.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 34-7. This paragraph summarizes pages 34-37.
- ³⁷ Goodstein et al., *Applied Strategic Planning*, 7.

³⁸ Ibid., vii-viii.

³⁹ Goodstein et al., *Applied Strategic Planning*, 93-109.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 109.

⁴¹ The authors strongly recommend employing an outside consultant to accomplish this assessment because members of the organization are often inculcated with the organizational culture to such a degree that they are unable to make objective observations and assessments concerning the organization. Goodstein et al., 81-2, 162.

⁴² Goodstein et al., *Applied Strategic Planning*, 146-66.

⁴³ Ibid., 159.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 147.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 154.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 57.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 161.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 161.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 161-2.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 170.

⁵¹ Ibid., 195-219. This paragraph summarizes pages 195-219.

⁵² Ibid., 195.

⁵³ Ibid., 225-56. This paragraph summarizes pages 225-256.

⁵⁴ The authors recommend four possible methods to close gaps: 1) Lengthen the time frame for accomplishing the objective, 2) Reduce the size or scope of the objective, 3) Reallocate resources, 4) or Obtain new resources. Goodstein et al., 277.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 261-81. This paragraph summarizes pages 261-281.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 283.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 283-306. This paragraph summarizes pages 283-306.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 309.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 309-22. This paragraph summarizes pages 309-322.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 325-48. This paragraph summarizes pages 325-348.

⁶¹ Ibid., 138.

⁶² Ibid., 138.

⁶³ Ibid., 119-40. This paragraph summarizes pages 119-140.

⁶⁴ Though the President or SecDef must formally approve the military end state, this approval is more similar to a ‘sanity check’ than a selection process. Military leaders make their recommendations, which generally are approved. This is a distinct contrast to developing several proposed military end states for the President or SecDef to choose from.

⁶⁵ Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, refers to Lines of Operation as “Lines of Effort.”

⁶⁶ Ibid., 4-10.

⁶⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning*, III-8. JP 5-0 states “the supported CCDR may recommend a military end state, but the President or SecDef should formally approve it.” III-8.

⁶⁸ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. “Whole of Government Planning,” 14.

⁶⁹ Goodstein et al., *Applied Strategic Planning*, 107-8.

⁷⁰ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning*, III-19.

⁷¹ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization website.

⁷² Cable et al., “Complementary and Supplementary Fit,” 825, 834.

⁷³ Example questions are: 1) “Who are two of your organization’s most esteemed members and why are they special or important?” 2) “What activities, actions, processes, or products/services are most important for your organization and why are they important?” 3) “Which members of your organization are the most knowledgeable about the history and the inner workings of your organization?”

⁷⁴ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, II-10. JIACG is “an interagency staff group that establishes . . . collaborative working relationships between [Other Government Agency] (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, DOS, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Treasury Department) representatives and military planners at the combatant commands.” CMOC represents a similar staff group for civil-military operations. “Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces, IGOs [International Government Organizations], NGOs [Non-governmental Organizations], and the private sector.” II-10.

⁷⁵ Said et al., 45-51.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 50.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 56.

⁷⁸ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning*, I-2.

⁷⁹ United States Air Force. “The 21st Century Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy,” 11.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 11.

Appendix A
Comparison of Models by Major Actions

	Joint Operation Planning Process (DoD)	Planning Framework (S/CRS)	Applied Strategic Planning (business)
			* Environmental Monitoring * Application Considerations
Problem identified / Receive initial guidance and direction	1. Initiation ¹	1. Receipt of Problem ²	1. Planning to Plan ³
Assess organization's values, operating philosophy, & culture			2. Values Scan
Analyze and describe the situation and environment	2. Mission Analysis ⁴	2. Situational Analysis	* Environmental Monitoring 3. Mission Formulation 4. Strategic Business Modeling ⁵ 5. Performance Audit 6. Gap Analysis 8. Contingency Planning ⁶
Compare proposed theories, goals / end states, and USG policies		3. Theory of Resolution and Goal/Endstates ⁷	4. Strategic Business Modeling ⁸
Develop approach(es) in detail	3. COA Development ⁹	4.3 Develop the Concept of Operations	4. Strategic Business Modeling ¹⁰ 5. Integrating Action Plans ¹¹ 9. Implementation ¹²
Analyze / simulate approach(es) in the context of the environment	4. COA Analysis & Wargaming	4.1 Understanding the Guidance 4.2 Understanding the Elements and Dynamics of the Conflict	7. Integrating Action Plans ¹³ [Note: ASP does not evaluate plans compared to 'worst case' scenarios but relies heavily on contingency plans in execution]
Evaluate anticipated effectiveness of each approach in relation to the problem	5. COA Comparison		7. Integrating Action Plans ¹⁴
Specific approach selected and/or approved	6. COA Approval ¹⁵	4.3.5 Write the Concept / Implementation Planning ¹⁶	7. Integrating Action Plans ¹⁷
Document specifics of selected approach for dissemination	7. Plan or Order Development	4.4 Write Strategy/Plan	9. Implementation *Application Considerations ¹⁸

Comparison of Models by Major Actions

(continued)

Notes:

*Continuous steps involved in each of the nine sequential steps

1. From Pres, NSC, SecDef, CJCS.
2. From Pres, NSC, SecState.
3. Primarily noting a problem(s) & forming a planning team.
4. Combatant Commander develops military end state. CCDR & staff develop Lines of Operations (LOO).
5. Develop Lines of Business (LOB), Critical Success Indicators (CSI), strategic thrusts, & determines necessary culture.
6. Develop trigger points & agree on actions to take.
7. Develop Major Mission Elements (MME) for each Theory of Resolution. Identify assumptions that could require alternate, or ‘branch’, plans. Final step, Deputies’ or Principals’ Committee approves one of the proposed USG policy options reflecting a transformational hypothesis, goals and end states, and theory of resolution. Approved policy option represents the mission statement.
8. Evaluate and select organizational end states/strategic goals.
9. Adversary ‘most likely’ and ‘most dangerous’ potential COAs considered. Branches and sequels developed.
10. Develop individual LOBs.
11. Develop Operational Plan for each functional sub-organization for each LOB; Operational plans combined to form Strategic Plan.
12. Leadership structures organization to ‘fit’ the Strategic Plan.
13. Evaluate each Operational Plan against the environment; analogous to JOPP’s ‘most likely’ scenario.
14. Evaluate each Operational Plan against strategic goals.
15. One of many selected and approved.
16. Previously-selected approach receives ‘feedback.’
17. Specific approach, known as “Strategic Plan” result of combining all Operational Plans selected by planning team.
18. Ensure broadest dissemination of finalized Strategic Plan.

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